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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW: CUSTOMER'S PERMANENT
EXCLUSION FROM RETAIL STORE DUE TO
PRIOR SHOPLIFTING ARRESTS HELD
ENFORCEABLE UNDER CRIMINAL TRESPASS
STATUTE
In United States v. Bean' the Superior Court for the District of
Columbia held that a retail business establishment may exclude from
its premises a particular member of the public solely on the grounds
of his previous arrest for shoplifting in the establishment, and that
criminal trespass statutes are applicable should such a person refuse
a request to leave. Upon entering a Sears, Roebuck and Company
store, Bean was recognized by a security officer as a person who had
previously been arrested for shoplifting in the store, and was asked
to leave. Bean left but he returned an hour later and refused to comply
with a second request to leave. The security officer then sought to
arrest him and a scuffle ensued. Criminal charges were brought
against Bean for assault and unlawful entry. Testimony at the trial
revealed that the store management maintained a picture file of all
persons arrested in the store for shoplifting and routinely excluded
such persons from the premises. It was also revealed that the
defendant had been twice convicted of petit larceny, though
apparently these convictions did not result from the previous Sears,
Roebuck arrest. The reported decision denied defendant's motion for
judgment of acquittal,2 which under the applicable rules of procedure
is made at trial after evidence of at least one side is closed. 3
The District of Columbia unlawful entry statute under which Bean
was prosecuted provides that "any person who [being on the property
of another] without lawful authority to remain therein or thereon shall
1. Crim. No. 50426-70 (D.C. Super. Ct., May 12, 1971), reprinted in 99 DAILY WASH.
L. REP. 965, col. 1 (1971).
2. Id. at 972, cal. 3.
3. FED. R. CruM. P. 29. The federal rules are in effect in the D.C. Superior Court. District
of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-
946 (Supp. 1971).
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refuse to quit . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor."'4 The statute
is similar to the criminal trespass statutes enacted in many
jurisdictions, 5 and is of the type used frequently during the 1960's
to prosecute "sit-in" demonstrators. 6 The statute merely enlarges
upon the common law remedies available to a property owner, adding
criminal prosecution by the state to the recovery of damages in tort
and the right to use reasonable force to remove a trespasser. Whether
a person has "lawful authority" to remain on the property is thus
controlled by common law. The basic rule is that the owner of a
business extends to all members of the public his express or implied
permission to enter, but that this permission may be withdrawn at
will and any person excluded.7 The right to exclude has been
overridden, however, by certain constitutional and statutory
provisions preventing exclusions based on race8 or exclusions
infringing first amendment rights
The common law right to exclude has been upheld primarily in
cases dealing with the ejection of an unruly, boisterous, or otherwise
obnoxious patron.1" Prior to Bean, no court had been called on to
apply the rule to an exclusion based on a patron's previous arrest
for shoplifting. A line of New York cases supports the right of
racetrack operators to refuse admission to persons known or thought
to be bookmakers." These cases, however, are based as much on
4. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3102 (1967).
5. See, e.g., BIRMINGHAM, ALA. CODE § 1436-43 (1944); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 577
(1957); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-134 (1953).
6. See, e.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267
(1963); State v. Avent, 253 N.C. 580, 118 S.E.2d 47 (1961), vacated and remanded per curiain,
373 U.S. 375 (1963), rev'd, 262 N.C. 425, 137 S.E.2d 161 (1964). "Sit-in" cases as used in
this recent development refer only to cases where the sit-in occurred as a protest against a
policy of excluding black customers. The term does not include cases in which sit-in tactics
are used to protest policies that are independent of refusing to serve a customer. Thus the term
does not include such cases as People v. Weinberg, 6 Mich. App. 345, 149 N.W.2d 248 (1967),
cited by the Bean court, in which the defendants staged a sit-in to protest alleged employment
and loan practices of a savings and loan association.
7. See. e.g., Silas v. Bowen, 277 F. Supp. 314 (D.S.C. 1967); Ramirez v. Chavez, 71 Ariz.
239, 226 P.2d 143 (1951); Johanson v. Huntsman, 60 Utah 402,209 P. 197 (1922).
8. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1964); Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948). See text accompanying notes 16-18 infra.
9. Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968);
Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). See text accompanying notes 21-22 infra.
10. See, e.g., Silas v. Bowen, 277 F. Supp. 314 (D.S.C. 1967); Ramirez v. Chavez, 71 Ariz.
239,226 P.2d 143 (1951); Symalla v. Dusenka, 206 Minn. 280,288 N.W. 385 (Minn. 1939).
11. Madden v. Queens County Jockey Club, 296 N.Y. 249, 72 N.E.2d 697 (1947); Gottlieb
v. Sullivan County Harness Racing Ass'n, 25 App. Div. 2d 798, 269 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1966);
People v. Licata, 63 Misc. 2d 585,312 N.Y.S.2d 774 (App. T. 1970).
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specific state racing commission regulations requiring that such
persons be kept out of licensed racetracks 2 as they are on the common
law right of an owner to exclude. In only one reported decision has
a retail store excluded a customer on the grounds of previous criminal
activity. In re D.13 involved a 15-year old girl who had been caught
opening pocketbooks belonging to other customers of a department
store. The customers did not press charges, but the store ordered the
girl to keep off its premises. Three months later she re-entered the
store and was arrested for criminal trespass. In adjudging her a
delinquent, the court stated that a store's right to exclude persons
who had previously been involved in criminal acts on the same
premises was "essential in order to properly protect the person and
property of customers of the store."" The court's concern with
protecting other customers, rather than the store itself, suggests that
In re D. involves little more than the common law duty of a store
to protect its patrons from foreseeable danger. 5 The case thus does
not hold that any criminal activity may be the basis for exclusion
from a retail store, but only such activity which, if repeated, would
endanger patrons.
Just as the courts have never previously been called upon to apply
the common law rule to an exclusion based on a patron's arrest
record, neither have any of the statutory or constitutional
modifications of the common law rule been construed to apply to
such a situation. It has never been suggested, for example, that the
1964 Civil Rights Act16 applies to retail outlets other than those with
dining facilities, or that it affects discrimination based on factors
other than race or religion. One court has held that since a higher
percentage of blacks have arrest records than whites, employment
discrimination based on arrest records and applied to blacks, in the
absence of legitimate business justification, is within the Civil Rights
Act."7 While this holding might be relied on by blacks with arrest
records, it would apparently be of no assistance if storeowners could
establish a legitimate business justification for the exclusion. 8
12. 19 N.Y. CODES, RULES, & REGS. §§ 4.46 (1962) (racing), 99.8 (1964) (harness racing).
13. 58 Misc. 2d 1093,296 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Family Ct., Juv. T. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,
33 App. Div. 2d 1028,308 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1970).
14. 58 Misc.2d at 1097,296 N.Y.S.2d at 829.
15. Compare In re D., 58 Misc. 2d 1093, 296 N.Y.S.2d 825 (Family Ct., Juv. T. 1968)
with NV. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS § 61, at 405 (3d ed. 1964).
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1964).
17. Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
18. The defense of "legitimate business justification" includes, but is considerably broader
than that of "foreseeable danger to customers." Such a defense could justify exclusion of not
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As with the statutory law, the two lines of constitutional
interpretation which bear on the owner's power to discriminate at
will with regard to the use of private property, have not been extended
to reach Bean. The first of these lines originates in Shelley v.
Kraemer,9 in which restrictive housing covenants were not enforced
by the Supreme Court because it found that judicial enforcement itself
would constitute state action to which the fourteenth amendment
applied. 0 The second line traces from Marsh v. Alabama2t and Food
Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,21 in both of which the
property rights of private owners were deemed to be restricted by the
first amendment on the grounds that in each case the property served
as a public facility.2Y The "sit-in" cases u presented the Supreme
Court with the opportunity to extend either Shelley or Marsh to reach
discrimination by private businesses which seek to attract and sell
to the public. However, the opinions of the Court in these cases
consistently turned on narrower groundss although two of the
concurring justices in Bell v. Maryland favored such an extension on
the basis of Shelley. 6 Thus, the extent of the constitutional limitations
on discrimination by privaie property owners in a retail commercial
setting can at best be said not to have been clearly resolved. In
summary, while the Bean court was presented with a case which
seemed to be controlled by the common law rule allowing private
property owners to discriminate at will, the situation was nevertheless
one to which the common law had never in fact been applied. At
the same time, while the case seemed to be but one step beyond
existing constitutional and statutory restrictions on the rights of
only shoplifters but also any other convicted criminal, so long as there is a reasonable relation
between his conviction and the exclusion. See generally note 44 infra.
19. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
20. In Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), the holding in Shelley was extended to
preclude actions at law for damages for breach of racially-restrictive covenants.
21. 326 U.S. 501 (1964).
22. 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
23. In Marsh, owners of a company town sought to exclude a Jehovah's witness who was
distributing literature on its sidewalks. In Logan Valley, a shopping center sought to exclude
persons picketing one of its stores.
24. E.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964);
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963); Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963);
Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (196 1).
25. For example, comments by city officials urging segregation were found to be a
conventional state action element sufficient to invoke the fourteenth amendment, Lombard v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963), as was the official deputization of the employee charged with
enforcing the discriminatory policy, Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
26. 378 U.S. 226,255-60 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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private property owners, prior courts had in fact consistently declined
to take the crucial step.
In deciding Bean, the D.C. Superior Court noted the common
law rule that licenses extended to business guests could be revoked
at will, and found that through its security officer the Sears, Roebuck
store had done so with regard to Bean solely because of his criminal
record. The court was aware that the situation was a novel one,
requiring more than routine citation of common law exclusion cases,
and considered at some length whether the common law rule as
applied to the defendant had been modified by constitutional
interpretation. The court recognized that Shelley seemingly
characterized as state action any state judicial enforcement of private
discrimination,21 but it concluded that the Supreme Court's consistent
refusal to extend Shelley beyond enforcement of restrictive covenants,
despite the obvious opportunities afforded by the sit-in cases,
precluded an extension of Shelley beyond its facts. 28 As for Marsh
and Logan Valley, the Bean court determined that the interior of a
retail store does not serve as a public facility as that concept was
used in those cases.Y The court went on to note that the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and a similar D.C. statute,3D were not applicable either
to retail stores without restaurants or to discrimination on other than
racial or religious grounds. Given the common law power to exclude
and the absence of a constitutional or statutory modification, the
court considered itself compelled to deny the motion for judgment
of acquittal. However, in its concluding remarks the court recognized
the burden on persons with previous arrests or convictions, observing
that such persons "should not for that reason suffer the penalty of
being unable to shop for the necessities of life." 3' The court, however,
felt that judicial relief in the present circumstances would require a
"tortured" interpretation of existing law, and that relief would thus
have to come from the legislature if it came at all.
The court in Bean was apparently troubled by the implications
of its decision, as indicated by its concluding remarks. Clearly the
decision is troubling, for it represents a heretofore unrecognized gap
between our ideals of criminal law and our actual practices. To
27. United States v. Bean. supra note I, at 971, col. 2.
28. Id. at 97 1, cols. 2-3.
29. Id. at 972, cots. 1-2.
30. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-2901 to 2903 (1967).
3 1. United States v. Bean, supra note 1, at 972, col. 3.
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exclude from a retail establishment because of a criminal arrest or
conviction is inconsistent with the notions that a man is not to suffer
sanctions for criminal conduct until proven guilty, that there should
be defined punishments directed toward rehabilitation, and that a
man is to be judged on his own merits and not those of a class to
which he may belong-albeit that the class has a high propensity to
engage in criminal activities. Further, what presently amounts to an
occasional inconvenience and humiliation could become a
considerably more serious impediment to normal and economical
living as large, impersonal self-service stores capture more of the
retail market,3z and as these establishments increase their shoplifting
controls.3 Although the Bean court was troubled, it could fashion
no effective role for itself in extending protection to persons with
arrest records. It did no more than state that "a proper role for the
courts in this area would seem to lie only in imposing strict
prohibitions on the promiscuous distribution of arrest records to
private persons and a firm judicial policy of expunging such records
where appropriate."3' This view of the judicial role is somewhat
mystifying, for in truth there appears to be no way in which it can
32. See Slowdown Creeps Up on the Small Store, Bus. WEEK, July 19, 1969, at 30. This
trend is also indicated by the steady increase in the proportion of total retail sales made by
FoRTuNE's 50 largest retail merchandisers, from 16% in 1959 to 20% in 1970. Total retail
sales for each year may be found in the 1971 EcONOMic REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 246. Sales
by the 50 largest retail merchandisers may be found as part of FoRT NE's annual report on
the 500 largest U.S. corporations. This report is normally published in May, June, or July.
33. Accounts of measures being taken to combat shoplifting, including small armies of
security personnel, electronic surveillance and detection, and study of state-supplied picture files,
may be found in Shoplifting: The Pinch that Hurts, Bus. WVEEK, June 27, 1970, at 72, and
Hellman, One in Ten Shoppers is a Shoplifter, N.Y. Times, March 15, 1970, section 6
(Magazine), at 34. These articles indicate that at present chief reliance is upon surveillance
and electronic detection devices. Apparently there is little emphasis on exclusion of known
shoplifters, and the sheer volume of known shoplifters might well cause the problems of
identification to be overwhelming-one large New York store made 18,000 shoplifting
apprehensions in 1969. Id. at 44. Retailers' concern for shoplifting prevention has been greatly
sharpened by the 150% increase in shoplifting during the 1960's. Id. at 34.
A possible incentive for retail stores to deny entry to known shoplifters is the ever-present
threat of being sued for erroneous apprehension for shoplifting, or false arrest, which places
a premium on keeping a person outside the premises altogether, avoiding the possibility of
having to confront him while he is inside the store. See, e.g., Devercelli v. The May Dept.
Stores Co., Civil No. GS 18034-70 (D.C. Super. Ct., June 15, 1971), reprinted in 99 DAILY
WASH. L. Rrp. 1169, 1173 (1971) ($165,000 judgment for false arrest within department store).
See also Wash. Post, July 21, 1971, at A-l, cols. 1-5 ("large judgments against stores have
been handed down recently in court suits brought by suspected shoplifters who have sued for
false arrest. . . .Hecht's has been ordered to pay $165,000 and $30,000 in two cases this year
34. United States v. Bean, supra note 1, at 972, col. 3.
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be effective. The legal and practical difficulties of precluding public
access to official records have generally prevented protection of
former criminals, even in states with expungement statutes.3 5 Further,
even effective control of official records would be undermined by the
ease with which large retail stores can assemble their own files on
persons arrested in their own stores. With equal ease they can trade
these files among themselves so that a person with a shoplifting record
could be excluded from all large stores in his area.36 There are at
present no legal theories with which a concerned judiciary can prevent
this type of dissemination of private records, at least so long as the
records are accurate. An invasion of privacy theory does not reach
this case, for two reasons. First, publicity is necessary, and selective
distribution does not qualify as publicity.37 Second, there can be no
invasion of privacy when the information that is distributed is of a
public nature.38 It has been uniformly held that information about
criminal activity is public in nature, and that actual or alleged
involvement in criminal activity deprives a person of his right to
privacy.39 In the end, the only remedy is for defamation, which is
useless so long as the information is correct."
The best judicial approach to discrimination on the basis of
criminal record, at least as to exclusion from retail stores, is the direct
holding that in a commercial setting the ownership of property
accords no such power. However, the Bean court is correct in its
conclusion that this holding could not turn on the constitutional
arguments arising from Shelley, or Marsh and Logan Valley.4 It is
35. See Kogon & Loughery, Sealing and Expungement of Criminal Record-The Big Lie,
61 J. CwtM. L.C. & P.S. 378 (1970); Comment, Criminal Records of Arrest and Conviction,
3 CAUF. W.L. Rv. 121 (1967); Note, Discrimination on the Basis of Arrest Records, 56
CORNEqLL L. Rv. 470 (1971); Note, Employment of Former Criminals, 55 CORNELL L. REv.
306 (1970).
36. One wonders, however, whether such a result is possible in the larger metropolitan areas,
given the sheer volume of known shoplifters. See note 33 supra.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, comment b (rent. Draft No. 13, 1967);
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. Rsv. 383,393-94 (1960).
38. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867, comment c (1939); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 652D, comment a, 652F (rent. Draft No. 13, 1967); Prosser, supra note 37, at 383, 394.
See generally Comment, Privileges to Report Matters of Public Interest, 21 S.C.L. REv. 92
(1968).
39. E.g., Frith v. Associated Press, 176 F. Supp. 671 (E.D.S.C. 1959); Coverstone v. Davies,
38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876 (1952); Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 56 Del. 67, 189 A.2d
773 (1963); RESTATEMbENT OF TORTS § 867, comment c (1939); RESTATEhENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652F, comment d (rent. Draft No. 13, 1967).
40. W. PROSSER, supra note 15, § 11, at 823-26.
41. See notes 19-23 supra and accompanying text.
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true that Shelley could logically be extended to this case, since judicial
enforcement of criminal trespass laws seems to involve at least as
much state action as judicial enforcement of private restrictive
covenants. However, as is emphasized in Bean, the Supreme Court
has consistently avoided extending Shelley.42 Of course, the issue is
not clearly foreclosed by the sit-in cases, for in those cases the
extension was only sidestepped, not rejected, by a majority of the
Court, and was endorsed by two justices. 43 However, a Shelley attack
on private business discrimination would be a substantial step which
the Supreme Court itself has not as yet taken, and would surely
require Supreme Court authorization. Further, even if Shelley were
accepted as a basis for finding state action, it is not at all clear that
any substantive constitutional provision would prohibit discrimina-
tion based on criminal record, assuming legitimate business justifi-
cations. 41
As a matter of both judicial economy and legal theory, a more
satisfactory approach would be a common law modification of the
stated rule. A common law court could hold, consistently with the
factual circumstances of conventional exclusion cases, that in the
context of modern retailing and matured concepts of the role of
corporate enterprise, a retailer may not exclude a person who neither
endangers other customers nor has shown that the particular visit has
been made for purposes other than legitimate business transactions.
In this connection it should be remembered that while the defendants
in Bean and the sit-in cases were prosecuted for the statutory offense
of criminal trespass, the courts look to the common law to determine
42. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra. Another case in which the Supreme Court
refused to extend Shelley, despite Justice Douglas' dissent, is Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S.
292 (1956).
43. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226,255-60 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
44. Equal protection is the obvious approach to discriminatory practices. However, equal
protection cases are subject to the defense that the discrimination is not arbitrary and unrelated
to a legitimate goal. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961). Assuming
that exclusion of known shoplifters would reduce shoplifting, equal protection thus seems useless
unless discrimination on the basis of criminal record were deemed to invoke the stricter equal
protection standard formally recognized'by the Court in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
638 (1969). However, criminal record discrimination involves none of the accepted fundamental
rights or constitutionally-proscribed classifications which have invoked the stricter standard
in Shapiro (right to interstate travel), Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race and right
to marry), and Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (right to political association). In any
case, equal protection has not yet restricted the ability of states themselves to discriminate
against former criminals. See Kogon & Loughery, supra note 35, at 384-85; Note,
Discrimination on the Basis of Arrest Records, supra note 35, at 474-75; Note, Employment
of Former Criminals, supra note 35, at 308-12.
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if such persons are trespassers. The Bean court felt that judicial relief
for discrimination by private businessmen would require a "tortured"
interpretation of the existing law.45 The court thus ignored a critical
characteristic of the common law-that rules change with the facts
which give those rules meaning. The common law is primarily a pro-
cess by which accepted rules are tested for continued validity by
comparing the circumstances and societal attitudes from which they
arose with the new sets of circumstances and attitudes brought before
the courts in succeeding cases.45 It is now appropriate to extensively
modify the rule that a private businessman may discriminate among
his patrons at will.
There are three obvious differences between the present cases
involving discrimination based on race or criminal record, and the
traditional cases such as those cited by the Bean court. The first, and
the narrowest, is that the traditional cases almost uniformly deal with
the rowdy and obnoxious customer who is disturbing or endangering
other customers.'7 Only the rare case has supported an owner's right
to exclude for a reason other than this one, or has supported
45. UnitedStates v. Bean, supra note 1, at 972, col. 3.
46. A discussion of this characteristic of the law may be found in E. LEvI, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948). Professor Levi summarizes his arguments at I-
4 and 102-04. A striking example of this process is the evolution of the "inherently dangerous"
rule, leading to MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) and
the breakdown of the privity limitation on liability for injuries caused by negligently-made
products. E. LEvi, supra, at 8-27. The change could occur because an advancing industrial
economy had modified the relationships of the various parties, the character of the sales
transaction, and the buyer's capacity to protect himself against defective goods.
47. Of thirty-nine reported cases since 1900 which have dealt with exclusion of a patron
from a retail establishment, twenty-four are concerned with apparently temporary ejection of
a boisterous or rowdy patron. See, e.g., cases cited in note 10 supra. The New York race track
cases account for three more (these cases are discussed and distinguished at notes 11-12 supra),
and In re D. is another (discussed and distinguished at notes 13-15 supra). Nine cases supported
the right of retail establishments to exclude all blacks and to arrest sit-in demonstrators
protesting against this policy. See, e.g., State v. Avent, 253 N.C. 580, 118 S.E.2d 47 (1961);
Greenville v. Peterson, 239 S.C. 298, 122 S.E.2d 826 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, 373 U.S.
244 (1963). Treating these sit-in cases as questionable precedent for a total power of exclusion
by modern corporate retailers, one is left with two cases which lend direct support to permanent
exclusion from a retail establishment for reasons possibly independent of race, protection of
customers, and regulatory requirements. One of these involved exclusion from a gambling
casino for prior misconduct of an undisclosed nature. Scott v. Justice's Ct., 84 Nev. 9, 435
P.2d 747 (1968). The other involved exclusion for undisclosed reasons from a one-man store
owned by a larger corporation. Alabama Fuel & Iron Co. v. Courson, 20 Ala. App. 312, 101
So. 638 (1924). Of the cases cited in Bean which actually deal with exclusion from a retail
establishment of a person seeking to transact business, United States v. Bean, supra note 1,
at 970, col. 3, and at 971, col. 1, one is a sit-in case and the others all involve apparently
temporary exclusion based on misconduct during the course of the visit in question.
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permanent exclusion even for this reason." It is not clear that a
blanket power of permanent exclusion, on a basis such as race or
criminal record, should be based on cases dealing with rowdy
drunkards. Second, the basic rule was established at a time when
retail shops were the personal business of their owner and his family.
Typically, a more personal relationship existed between the proprietor
and his customers, with greater elements of personal service in the
proprietor's role. If there was justification for a right of arbitrary
exclusion in such a context, this justification is quite completely lost
in the context of large, impersonal, self-service corporate retailers.4"
One is hard-pressed to find any basis either in protecting personal
privacy or in society's interest in encouraging entrepreneurship, for
permitting exclusion of someone who wishes to do business in a
corporate establishment that seeks to attract and sell to the general
public. The third difference between the older exclusion cases and
Bean is the current acceptance of the notion that private businesses
may properly be subjected to societal burdens both as a method of
effecting such social policies as racial integration and humane work-
ing conditions, and as a method of spreading both the burdens result-
ing from these policies and the normal risks inherent in a mass-
production industrial economy."
Against this evolving background of the nature of retail trade and
of our concepts of the role of business in society, a court faced with
the Bean situation must recognize that the basis for excluding.
shoplifters is not personal individual preferences or protection of
other customers. Rather, it is that by doing so one excludes a class
whose individual members are more likely to engage in shoplifting
48. See note 47 supra.
49. Concerning the continued growth of corporate retailing, see note 32 supra.
50. Child-labor laws, pollution control, workman's compensation, and the 1964 Civil
Rights Act are legislative results of the realization that today's businesses have too great an
impact on the quality of life, and on our efforts to bring social fact into line with social values,
to be treated as strictly private. Similarly, the courts have eliminated the rule of caveat emptor
and are now evolving a doctrine of strict products liability. See Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). The courts have also imposed the full and extensive
duty of care and standard of foreseeability owed to business invitees, W. PROSSER, supra note
15, § 61, the responsibility of a business enterprise for the negligence of its employees, Id. § 69,
and such contract doctrines as unconscionability, A. CORBIN, CONTRACTs § 128 (1963), and
voidness as against public policy, Id. § 1375. The older commonlaw concept that common
carriers and innkeepers are public businesses, bound to serve all comers, RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 259 (1965), is also precedent for the judicial capacity to impose public-
interest burdens on businesses.
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than is the average customer.5 This may reduce the losses from
shoplifting and the costs of store security operations, resulting in
some combination of higher profits and lower consumer prices, 2 but
one wonders whether these economic gains should be given great
weight against the restrictions and public humiliation that an
exclusionary policy imposes on former shoplifters, whether or not
they are attempting to enter the store for a legal purpose. Our crimi-
nal system generally goes to great expense and formulates elaborate
procedure to prevent the sacrifice of individual justice for the sake
of more expedient law enforcement. Private businesses of a large and
impersonal nature should not be allowed in their public contacts to
defeat the fundamental societal policies of .racial equality,
individualized justice, and defined rehabilitative punishment. Our
concern for private property should be reflected less in terms of
property and more in terms of privacy and the emerging
constitutional protections for privacy.5s That property happens to be
owned privately should not be allowed to mechanically control
questions of accesss in complete disregard of whether the property is
a home, a semi-private office, a family shop, or one of the many
Sears, Roebuck outlets. Discriminatory exclusion from business
property may be eliminated by common law courts within their tradi-
tion of shaping legal rules to the existing factual setting and to pre-
vailing perceptions of both social values and the proper roles of
various segments of society.
51. See United States v. Bean. supra note 1, at 972, col. 3.
52. Retailers estimate their annual shoplifting losses at two billion dollars. Hellman, supra
note 33.
53. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
54. That rights arising from private ownership may be judicially limited was recognized re-
cently in State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1.971), a criminal trespass prosecution
against persons seeking to visit migrant farm workers at quarters owned by the workers' em-
ployer. In reversing the conviction, a unanimous court refused to extend Marsh or other con-
stitutional doctrines. Id. at _, 277 A.2d at 371. Rather, the court ruled that there was no
trespass-no possessory right of the owner had been invaded, for he could have no right to
"isolate the migrant worker in any respect significant for the worker's well-being." Id.
at - 277 A.2d at 374. In so'holding, the court stated that "[p]roperty rights serve human
values. They are recognized to that end, and are limited by it." Id. at - 277 A.2d at 372.
The Shack court was clearly exercising a common-law power to determine the rights accorded
private ownership.
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